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Abstract. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984, 1996; Groenendijk 1999) provide a
logically attractive theory of the semantics of natural language questions, commonly
referred to as the partition theory. Two central notions in this theory are entailment
between questions and answerhood. For example, the question Who is going to the
party? entails the question Is John going to the party?, and John is going to the
party counts as an answer to both. Groenendijk and Stokhof define these two
notions in terms of partitions of a set of possible worlds.
We provide a syntactic characterization of entailment between questions and an-
swerhood. We show that answers are, in some sense, exactly those formulas that are
built up from instances of the question. This result lets us compare the partition
theory with other approaches to interrogation—both linguistic analyses, such as
Hamblin’s and Karttunen’s semantics, and computational systems, such as Prolog.
Our comparison separates a notion of answerhood into three aspects: equivalence
(when two questions or answers are interchangeable), atomic answers (what in-
stances of a question count as answers), and compound answers (how answers
compose).
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1 The partition theory of questions
An elegant account of the semantics of natural language questions from a
logical and mathematical perspective is the one provided by Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1984). According to them, a question denotes a partition of
a logical space of possibilities. In this section, we give a brief summary of
this influential theory, using a notation slightly different from Groenendijk’s
(1999) presentation.
A question is essentially a first order formula, possibly with free variables.
We will denote a question by ?φ, where φ is a first order formula. (We will
also denote a set of questions by ?Φ, where Φ is a set of first order formulas.)
An answer is also a first order formula, but one that stands in a certain
answerhood relation with respect to the question, spelled out later in this
section. For example, the statement Everyone is going to the party (∀xPx)
will turn out to answer the question Who is going to the party? (?Px).
We assume that equality is in the language, so one can ask questions such
as Who is John? (?x≈j). We also assume that, for every function symbol—
including constants—it is indicated whether it is interpreted rigidly or not.
Intuitively, for a function symbol to be rigid means that its denotation is
known. For example, under the notion of answerhood that we will introduce
below, it is only appropriate to answer Who is going to the party? (?Px)
with John is going to the party (Pj) if it is known who John is—in other
words, if j is rigid. Also, for Who is John? (?x ≈ j) to be a non-trivial
question, John must have a non-rigid interpretation.
Questions are interpreted relative to first order modal structures with
constant domain. That is, a model is of the form (W,D, I), where W is
a set of worlds, D is a domain of entities, and I is an interpretation func-
tion assigning extensions to the predicates and function symbols, relative
to each world. Furthermore, we only consider models that give rigid func-
tion symbols the same extension in every world. Relative to such a model
M = (W,D, I), a question ?φ expresses a partition of W , in other words an
equivalence relation over W :
(1.1) [?φ]M = { (w, v) ∈W
2 | ∀g : M,w, g |= φ⇔M,v, g |= φ } .
Roughly speaking, two worlds are equivalent if one cannot tell them apart
by means of the question ?φ, in other words if φ is never true in one world
and false in the other. In general, any set of questions ?Φ also expresses a
partition of W , namely the intersection of the partitions expressed by its
elements:
[?Φ]M =
⋂
φ∈Φ[?φ]M
= { (w, v) ∈W 2 | ∀φ ∈ Φ: ∀g : M,w, g |= φ⇔M,v, g |= φ } .
(1.2)
Entailment between questions is defined as a refinement relation among
partitions (i.e., equivalence relations): An equivalence relation A is a subset
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of another equivalence relation B if every equivalence class of A is contained
in a class of B.
(1.3) ?Φ |= ?ψ iff ∀M : [?Φ]M ⊆ [?ψ]M .
The intuitive interpretation of ?Φ |= ?ψ is that resolving the questions ?Φ
implies (requires) resolving the question ?ψ. In other words, the ques-
tions ?Φ distinguish between more worlds than the question ?ψ does.
A more fine-grained notion of entailment is as follows (Groenendijk
1999). Let χ be a first order formula with no free variables, and let M |= χ
mean that M,w |= χ for all w.
(1.4) ?Φ |=χ ?ψ iff ∀M : M |= χ⇒ [?Φ]M ⊆ [?ψ]M .
Pronunciation: The questions ?Φ entail the question ?ψ in the context of χ
(or, given χ). The context χ is intended to capture assertions in the common
ground: If it is commonly known that everyone who got invited to the party
is going, and vice versa (∀x(Ix↔ Px)), then the questionsWho got invited?
(?Ix) and Who is going? (?Px) entail each other.
This entailment relation between questions allows us to define a notion
of answerhood.
Definition 1 (Answerhood). Let ?φ be a question and ψ a first order
formula without free variables. We say that ψ is an answer to ?φ if ?φ |= ?ψ.
According to this notion (termed licensing by Groenendijk (1999) and about-
ness by Lewis (1988)), Everyone is going to the party (∀xPx) is an answer
to Who is going to the party? (?Px), because ?Px |= ?∀xPx.
Note that, under this definition, any contradiction or tautology counts as
an answer to any question. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) define a stricter
notion of being a partial semantic answer (pertinence in Groenendijk 1999),
which excludes these two trivial cases by formalizing Grice’s Maxims of
Quality and Quantity, respectively. In this paper, however, we will stick to
the simpler criterion of answerhood as defined above, which can be seen to
formalize Grice’s Maxim of Relation. This is not because we believe the tau-
tology and the contradiction to be appropriate answers, but rather because
they are trivial cases that do not play a very interesting role in a theory
of answerhood, merely complicating the picture by requiring a syncategore-
matic treatment. By the way, the inappropriateness of tautological and
contradictory assertions is not specific to the case of questions and answers.
We now have a semantic notion of answerhood, that of Definition 1,
telling us what counts as an answer to a question. For practical purposes,
it is useful to also characterize this notion syntactically. Can one give a
simple syntactic property that is a necessary and sufficient condition for
answerhood? The next section shows how.
3
2 A syntactic characterization of answerhood
First, let us look at a partial result discussed by Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1984) and Kager (2001). Define rigidity of terms and formula instances in
the following straightforward way.
Definition 2 (Rigidity). A term is rigid if it is composed of variables
and rigid function symbols. A formula φ is a rigid instance of another
formula ψ if φ can be obtained from ψ by uniformly substituting rigid terms
for variables. An identity statement s ≈ t is rigid if the terms s and t are
rigid.
For example, if c is a rigid constant, then rigid instances of Px include
Pc and Px. The identity statement c ≈ x is also rigid. Notice that rigid
instances are not necessarily rigid: If c is rigid, then Rcd is a rigid instance
of Rxd even if the constant d is not rigid.
Groenendijk and Stokhof and Kager observed that rigid instances of a
question constitute answers to that question. By a simple inductive argu-
ment, one can generalize this a bit.
Definition 3 (Development). A formula ψ is a development of another
formula φ (written φ ≤ ψ) if ψ is built up from rigid instances of φ and
rigid identity statements using boolean connectives and quantifiers. In other
words, the developments of φ are the formulas ψ generated by
(1.5) ψ ::= φσ | t1 ≈ t2 | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | ∃xψ | ∀xψ ,
where t1 and t2 are rigid terms, and σ substitutes rigid terms for variables.
For example, if c and d are rigid constants, then both Pc∧Pd and ∃x
(
Px∧
¬(x≈ c)
)
are developments of Px.
Theorem 1. If φ ≤ ψ then ?φ |= ?ψ.
Proof. By induction on the size of φ.
Theorem 1 says that every development of φ is an answer to ?φ. We can
prove a converse of sorts: Every answer to ?φ is equivalent to a development
of φ. The proof proceeds roughly as follows. Recall that answerhood is
defined in terms of question entailment. Suppose that ψ is an answer to
the question ?φ. Then ?φ |= ?ψ. Using a certain translation procedure,
we can turn this question entailment into an ordinary first order entailment
?φ# |= ?ψ#. Next, we apply Craig’s interpolation theorem for first order
logic to obtain an interpolant ϑ, from which we can recover an answer to the
original question ?φ. Finally, we show that this answer is in fact equivalent
to ψ, and a development of φ.
Before we present the theorem and its proof in more detail, we will
mention the procedure that we use to translate question entailment into
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first order entailment. For any first order formula φ, let φ∗ be the result
of priming all non-rigid non-logical symbols. For example, if c is a rigid
constant symbol and d is a non-rigid constant symbol, and
(1.6) φ = ∃x(Pxc ∧ ¬Pyd) ,
then
(1.7) φ∗ = ∃x(P ′xc ∧ ¬P ′yd′) .
Next, translate any question ?φ with free variables x1, . . . , xn to the formula
(1.8) ?φ# = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(φ↔ φ
∗) .
For instance, the example question ?φ translates to
(1.9) ?φ# = ∀y
(
∃x(Pxc ∧ ¬Pyd)↔ ∃x(P ′xc ∧ ¬P ′yd′)
)
.
Then the question entailment ?φ |=χ ?ψ is valid iff the first order entailment
?φ#, χ, χ∗ |= ?ψ# is valid. A detailed proof is given elsewhere (ten Cate and
Shan 2002), based a one-to-one correspondence between first order models
for the enriched signature (with primed copies of the non-rigid non-logical
symbols) and first order modal structures for the original signature that
contain exactly two worlds.
Using this translation, we can now formulate and prove the following
converse-modulo-equivalence of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that ?φ |=χ ?ψ, and let ~y be the free variables of ψ.
Then there exists some formula ϑ with no free variables beside ~y such that
φ ≤ ϑ and χ |= ∀~y(ψ ↔ ϑ).
Proof. First, we will prove the special case where φ is an atomic formula,
say P~x. Suppose that ?P~x |=χ ?ψ(~y). Then, using the translation procedure
discussed above,
(1.10) ∀~x(P~x↔ P ′~x), χ, χ∗ |= ∀~y(ψ(~y)↔ ψ∗(~y)) .
As a fact of first order logic, we can replace the universally quantified vari-
ables in the consequent by some freshly chosen constants ~c. This results in
(1.11) ∀~x(P~x↔ P ′~x), χ, χ∗ |= ψ(~c)↔ ψ∗(~c) ,
and, from this,
(1.12) ∀~x(P~x↔ P ′~x), χ∗, ψ∗(~c) |= χ→ ψ(~c) .
By Craig’s interpolation theorem for first order logic, we can construct an
interpolant ϑ(~c) such that
∀~x(P~x↔ P ′~x), χ∗, ψ∗(~c) |= ϑ(~c) ,(1.13)
ϑ(~c) |= χ→ ψ(~c) ,(1.14)
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and the only non-logical symbols in ϑ(~c) are those occurring on both sides
of (1.12). From the way the translation procedure (·)∗ is set up, it follows
that the only non-logical symbols that χ∗ and ψ∗ on the one hand, and χ
and ψ on the other hand, have in common, are rigid function symbols. Thus,
ϑ(~c) contains no non-logical symbols beside P , ~c, and rigid function symbols.
Removing primes uniformly from all predicate and function symbols
in (1.13), we get χ |= ψ(~c) → ϑ(~c). From (1.14), we get the converse:
χ |= ϑ(~c)→ ψ(~c). Together, this gives us
(1.15) χ |= ψ(~c)↔ ϑ(~c) .
Since the constants ~c do not occur in χ, we can replace them by universally
quantified variables. This results in
(1.16) χ |= ∀~y(ψ(~y)↔ ϑ(~y)) .
Furthermore, ϑ(~y) contains no non-logical symbols beside P and rigid func-
tion symbols. This means that ϑ(~y) is built up from instances of P~x, rigid
identity statements, ⊤, and ⊥ using the boolean connectives and quantifiers.
As a last step, we replace ⊤ by ∀~xP~x ∨ ¬∀~xP~x and ⊥ by ∀~xP~x ∧ ¬∀~xP~x.
The result is a development of P~x.
As for the general case, suppose ?φ(~x) |=χ ?ψ. Choose a fresh predicate
symbol P with the same arity as the number of free variables of φ. Then it
follows that ?P~x |=χ∧∀~x(P~x↔φ(~x)) ?ψ. Apply the above strategy to obtain a
development ϑ of ?P~x such that χ ∧ ∀~x(P~x ↔ φ(~x)) |= ∀~y(ϑ ↔ ψ). Let ϑ′
be the result of replacing all subformulas in ϑ of the form P~z by φ(~z). Then
ϑ′ is a development of φ, and χ |= ∀~y(ψ ↔ ϑ′).
Thus, the syntactic notion of development corresponds precisely to the se-
mantic notion of entailment between questions.
As an example, suppose that it is commonly known that everyone who
got invited to the party is going, and vice versa (χ = ∀x(Ix ↔ Px)), and
the identity of John is known (j is rigid). In response to the question Who is
going to the party? (?φ = ?Px), it is appropriate to answer John is invited
(ψ = Ij). As assured by Theorem 2, the answer ψ is equivalent to some
development ϑ of φ given χ; in this example, we can take ϑ = Pj.
Recall that the formula χ represents an assertion in the common ground.
If there is no assertion in the common ground (i.e., χ = ⊤), then Theorems
1 and 2 reduce to the following syntactic characterization of answerhood.
Corollary 1. A formula ψ without free variables is an answer to ?φ iff ψ
is equivalent to a development of φ.
This result easily generalizes from entailment by a single question to
entailment by a set of questions. (A development of a set of formulas Φ
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is a formula built up from rigid instances of elements of Φ and rigid iden-
tity statements using boolean connectives and quantifiers) Likewise, if we
eliminate equality from the logical language, then the characterization still
applies. (The appropriate notion of development is then a formula built up
from rigid instances using boolean connectives and quantifiers)
This syntactic characterization is useful for at least two purposes. First,
it makes possible a thorough investigation of the predictions made by Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof’s theory of answerhood: It shows what their semantic
theory really amounts to, syntactically speaking. Second, this result opens
the way to practical question answering algorithms: A question answering
system can operate purely by symbolic manipulation without referring to
the semantics. The remainder of this paper will concentrate on the first
application: We will use our characterization to clarify the relation between
the partition theory and other theories on the semantics of questions.
3 Comparing theories of questions
So far, we have provided a syntactic characterization of the partition theory
notion of answerhood. Our characterization affords us a new perspective on
exactly what assumptions are made by the partition theory, because from its
statement we can directly read off three aspects of a notion of answerhood:
Equivalence When are two questions or answers interchangeable? The
partition theory considers formulas modulo logical equivalence.
Atomic answers What instances of a question count as answers? The
partition theory admits rigid instances of the question as answers.
Compound answers How do answers compose? The partition theory
builds up answers using boolean connectives and quantifiers.
We can now examine each aspect of answerhood in turn, and compare the
partition theory (in particular its notion of licensing) with other theories of
answerhood.
3.1 Equivalence
In response to the question Is John friendly?, all theories agree that (1.17a)
counts as an answer and (1.17b) does not (or only in a very specific context).
But what about the responses in (1.18)?
(1.17) a. John is friendly.
b. It is raining.
(1.18) a. John is not unfriendly.
b. If 2 + 2 = 4 then John is friendly, otherwise it is raining.
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Theories that base meanings on propositions as sets of possible worlds equate
the logically equivalent sentences (1.17a), (1.18a), and (1.18b), so they pre-
dict that the three sentences are all acceptable answers. These theories
include Hamblin’s (1973) and Karttunen’s (1977) proposals, where each
question denotes a set of answers, as well as Groenendijk and Stokhof’s
partition theory. By contrast, theories such as that of Higginbotham and
May (1981), where meanings are based on the syntactic form of formulas,
treat the same three sentences as distinct and unrelated, thus predicting only
the answer (1.17a). As Higginbotham and May (1981) phrase it themselves:
On the view of questions developed here they are individuated by their
linguistic form, and count as distinct even if their content is in some
sense the same. This identity criterion contrasts with that emerging
most naturally from possible worlds semantics as applied to questions,
in which they would be individuated by their propositional content;
see, for example, Karttunen (1977). An immediate consequence of
this latter approach is that the question whether p and the question
whether q are identical if p and q are necessarily equivalent. Similarly,
What is the sum of 16 and 2? and What is the product of 3 and 6?
will express the same question. This consequence does not follow for
the view sketched here; it remains for us an explicative task to anal-
yse the relation obtaining between questions when they are equivalent
propositionally, but not notationally.
Thus, if we want to rule in (1.17a) and (1.18a) as answers yet rule out
(1.18b), then propositional equivalence faces the problem of logical omni-
science, and notational equivalence faces the problem of syntactic variation.
How the partition theory handles equivalence is clear in the statement
of Corollary 1, which bestows answerhood on not just developments of the
question but also all logically equivalent formulas. We could change this
definition of answerhood to use a finer-grained notion of formula equivalence.
For instance, we might adopt some notion of ‘strong equivalence’ under
which (1.17a) and (1.18a) are equivalent to each other but not to (1.18b).
In this way, we can separate concerns specific to answerhood from the general
problem of logical omniscience, and render the partition theory comparable
to, say, Higginbotham and May’s treatment of questions. (Alternatively, one
could invoke Grice’s Maxim of Manner to rule out answers such as (1.18b).)
Equivalence depends on the context in which questions and answers oc-
cur. For example, if it is known that Sue and Bill are John’s parents, then
one can answer (1.19a) with (1.19b).
(1.19) a. I know that Bill left, but did John’s mother leave?
b. Sue left as well.
The partition theory naturally handles such contexts: The formula L(s)
answers the question ?L(m(j)) given the context χ = s≈m(j), in that the
entailment ?L(m(j)) |=χ ?L(s) is valid, as is easily seen through Theorem 2.
8
This example illustrates that what questions and answers are equivalent
depends on the common ground between the questioner and the answerer.
This dependence is easier to capture in the partition theory, which specifies
an entailment relation between questions and answers, than in theories where
each question completely determines its answers, as a set of propositions or
closed formulas.
3.2 Atomic answers
Everybody agrees that the question Who left? can be answered with state-
ments of the form [. . . ] left, but it is unclear what noun phrases can fill the
blank.
(1.20) a. John left.
b. The owner of US passport 126392058 left.
c. John’s mother left (but I’m not sure who she is).
If the identity of John is known, then (1.20a) is usually an acceptable an-
swer, unlike (1.20b), which is usually unacceptable because the hearer is
unlikely to know the denotation of the noun phrase the owner of US pass-
port 126392058. Responses like (1.20c) fall in a gray area. Note also that the
question alone does not completely determine the acceptable noun phrases:
The question Who is the president of Mali? calls for a different answer at a
class exam than at a high party (Aloni 2000). Ginzburg (1995a,b) has raised
important objections to simple-minded theories of answerhood, by arguing
that pragmatics plays a role in determining what counts as an answer in
a given context. As he argues, not only does common ground knowledge
(whether the denotation of a term is known) play a role, but also the goals
and the intentions of the questioner.
As shown by our syntactic characterization, the partition theory man-
dates that the acceptable descriptions are precisely the rigid ones. That is,
only rigid instances of the question can be used to build up an answer. On
this issue of acceptable descriptions, most other semantic accounts of interro-
gation remain silent at best (Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977; Higginbotham
and May 1981; Krifka 2001). Take for example Karttunen’s theory, among
the more precisely specified of the alternatives. It assigns denotations to in-
terrogative clauses by quantifying over individual concepts, not individuals.
In principle, this move opens the door for non-rigid descriptions. However,
perhaps since he was not conscious of the move, Karttunen does not specify
exactly which concepts to quantify over, in other words exactly which de-
scriptions to allow. (To indiscriminately quantify over all concepts would in-
correctly predict that almost nobody knows the full answer to any question.)
Which terms are rigid depends on the context. In general, as the common
ground increases, more and more terms become rigid—the denotation of
more and more terms becomes known. Given that the appropriateness of
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answers depends on rigidity, it is expected that what is allowed as an answer
depends on the amount of information that is common ground. The partition
theory nicely accounts for this, as we saw in Sect. 3.1.
We view the rigidity criterion as an attempt to approximate whether a
description ‘specifies’ an entity. This approximation is not perfect, as shown
by the following exchange (provided to us by a referee).
(1.21) [The Amsterdam Marathon course has been altered.]
A: Who will these changes affect most?
B: The winner. He will be annoyed to have to run the last kilometer
on cobblestones.
B’s answer above is perfectly acceptable even before the marathon takes
place and the winner becomes known (rigid). Such examples, together with
Ginzburg’s (1995a,b) observations, motivate us to refine how our definition
of answerhood models specification. Aloni (2000) has taken up this point
by extending the partition theory with the notion of conceptual covers to
allow for much more fine-grained control over what instances count as atomic
answers. Her theory also accounts for questions such as Who is who?.
So far, we have not discussed another kind of atomic answers predicted by
the partition theory, namely (rigid) identity statements. Identity statements
by themselves are usually trivial and infelicitous as answers, but they are
essential in compound answers such as Only John is coming to the party
(∀x(Px→ x≈j)). Perhaps the definition of development could be improved
by excluding identity statements of the form x≈ y, where both x and y are
variables. This would exclude the problematic answer ∃x∃y¬(x≈ y) (“there
exist at least two entities”).
3.3 Compound answers
All theories agree that the conjunction of two answers still counts as an
answer (if the conjuncts are mutually consistent). For example, because
John left and Mary left are both answers to Who left?, the conjunction
John left and Mary left is again an answer. Oftentimes (as in Hamblin
1973; Karttunen 1977; Higginbotham and May 1981), when questions are
analyzed as denoting a set of answers, the set is actually construed to contain
the atomic answers only: the proposition that John left and the proposition
that Mary left, say, but not the proposition that John left and Mary left. It
is then explicitly stated or implicitly understood that, not only are elements
of this set appropriate answers, but their conjunctions are as well.
The partition theory takes rigid instances of the question to be atomic an-
swers. However, it goes far beyond licensing conjunctions of atomic answers:
As Corollary 1 makes clear, it allows arbitrary propositions composed from
rigid instances using boolean connectives and quantifiers. Consequently, it
predicts that all of the following are appropriate answers.
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(1.22) a. John left.
b. John left and Mary left.
c. Either John left, or Mary left.
d. John did not leave.
e. If anyone left, then John did.
f. Everyone left.
g. Nobody left except John.
h. Somebody left.
i. Somebody other than John didn’t leave.
The view that developments approximate the logical compositionality of
answers thus prompts us to refine how our definition of answerhood models
composition.
On one hand, the boolean connectives illustrated in (1.22b–d) are easy
to deal with in a theory of interrogation where the meaning of each question
determines a set of atomic answers. For instance, if we wish to permit
disjunctions like (1.22c) as answers, we can simply let the set of appropriate
answers be the closure of the set of atomic answers under disjunction in
addition to conjunction.
On the other hand, quantifiers as illustrated in (1.22e–i) are harder to
treat in any theory where (atomic) answers are closed formulas: To build up
the proposition that everyone left (∀xLx), we cannot just combine formulas
expressing that specific individuals left (Lj, Lm, . . . ). That free variables
are necessary is reflected in our definition of rigid terms, which includes
variables. If we wish to treat questions as sets of atomic answers while
maintaining closure of answerhood under quantification, one would have to
introduce atomic answers that are not propositional, in other words semantic
objects that correspond to logical formulas with free variables.
A move in the direction of non-propositional atomic answers has been
made by the so-called functional or “structured meaning” approach to inter-
rogation. Under this approach, which has a long history, “question meanings
are functions that, when applied to the meaning of the [short] answer, yield
a proposition” (Krifka 2001; a recent exposition). For instance, the meaning
of Who left? is
(1.23) λx.Lx ,
which when applied to John yields the proposition John left, as in (1.22a).
To generate compound answers, this approach can be turned on its head:
by viewing the responsive phrase as the operator, as Ginzburg (1996) puts
it, the meaning of everyone becomes the functional λc.∀x c(x), which when
applied to (1.23) yields the proposition ∀xLx, as in (1.22f). In this way,
generalized quantifiers can form compound answers as well as atomic ones.
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Incidentally, notice that the answers in (1.22a–g) seem more appropriate
than those in (1.22h–i). These two groups of answers are distinguished by
the following criterion: On one hand, the answers in (1.22a–g) correspond
to formulas built up from atomic answers and negations thereof using con-
junction, disjunction, and universal quantification (but not existential quan-
tification). On the other hand, the answers in (1.22h–i) are not of this type,
as they essentially involve existential quantification. A simple modification
of the definition of development allows us to capture these observations.
4 Conclusion
We presented a syntactic characterization of a notion of answerhood for the
partition semantics of questions. In terms of the partition theory itself, this
result explains the meaning of a question in terms of the form of its answers.
Moreover, in relation to other theories of interrogation, this result lets us
separate a notion of answerhood into three aspects:
1. equivalence (when two questions or answers are interchangeable),
2. atomic answers (what instances of a question count as answers), and
3. compound answers (how answers compose).
Organized along these three dimensions, theories of questions can then be
compared in a principled way. In particular, theories differ in their notions
of compound answers, and hence in how they hypothesize answers compose.
Apart from a more detailed comparison of theories of questions, we are
investigating two directions for further research. First, as we mentioned
already in Sect. 2, our result bears on computational question answering
algorithms. For example, we conceive of Prolog as a question answering
algorithm in the partition theory sense (ten Cate and Shan 2002).
Second, we suggested several ways in which the definition of development
might be adjusted to better reflect our intuitions concerning what counts as
an answer to a question. These adjustments, like our original definition
of development, were stated syntactically, but we naturally wonder whether
they correspond to sensible variants of the (model-theoretic) semantics given
in (1.1). To illustrate briefly, consider again the alternative definition of de-
velopments suggested at the end of the previous section, according to which
compound answers must be built up from atomic answers without existen-
tial quantification. A well-known model-theoretic result states that the first
order properties that can be expressed without existential quantification are
precisely the ones that are preserved under taking generated submodels. We
leave it as an open question whether this model-theoretic requirement can
be given an intuitive linguistic motivation. Perhaps this also explains why
John left is intuitively a good answer to the question Did anybody leave?.
12
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